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FORMAL PRIVACY FOR FUNCTIONAL DATA
WITH GAUSSIAN PERTURBATIONS
By Ardalan Mirshani Matthew Reimherr∗ and Aleksandra Slavkovic †
Pennsylvania State University
Motivated by the rapid rise in statistical tools in Functional Data
Analysis, we consider the Gaussian mechanism for achieving differen-
tial privacy with parameter estimates taking values in a, potentially
infinite-dimensional, separable Banach space. Using classic results
from probability theory, we show how densities over function spaces
can be utilized to achieve the desired differential privacy bounds.
This extends prior results of Hall et al. [22] to a much broader class
of statistical estimates and summaries, including “path level” sum-
maries, nonlinear functionals, and full function releases. By focusing
on Banach spaces, we provide a deeper picture of the challenges for
privacy with complex data, especially the role regularization plays
in balancing utility and privacy. Using an application to penalized
smoothing, we explicitly highlight this balance in the context of mean
function estimation. Simulations and an application to diffusion tensor
imaging are briefly presented, with extensive additions included in a
supplement.
1. Introduction. New studies, surveys, and technologies are resulting in ever richer and more
informative data sets. Data being collected as part of the “big data revolution” occurring in the
sciences have dramatically expanded the pace of scientific progress over the last several decades, but
often contain a significant amount of personal or subject level information. These data and their
corresponding analyses present substantial challenges for preserving subjects’ privacy as researchers
attempt to understand what information can be publicly released without impeding scientific
advancement and policy making [31].
One type of big data that has been heavily researched in the statistics community over the last
two decades is functional data, with the corresponding branch of statistics called functional data
analysis, FDA. FDA is concerned with conducting statistical inference on samples of functions,
trajectories, surfaces, and other similar objects. Such tools have become increasingly necessary as
our data gathering technologies become more sophisticated. FDA methods have proven very useful
in a wide variety of fields including economics, finance, genetics, geoscience, anthropology, and
kinesiology, to name only a few [34, 35, 19, 23, 28]. Indeed, nearly any data rich area of science will
eventually come across applications that are amenable to FDA techniques. However, functional and
other high dimensional data are also a rich source of potentially personally identifiable information
[29, 18, 37].
Related Work: To date, there has been very little work concerning FDA and statistical data
privacy, in either Statistical Disclosure Limitation, SDL or Differential Privacy, DP. SDL is the branch
of statistics concerned with limiting identifying information in released data and summaries while
maintaining their utility for valid statistical inference, and has a rich history for both methodological
developments and applications for “safe” release of altered (or masked) microdata and tabular data
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2 MIRSHANI, REIMHERR, AND SLAVKOVIC
[11, 36, 41, 20, 25]. DP has emerged from theoretical computer science with a goal of designing
privacy mechanisms with mathematically provable disclosure risk [13, 16]. Hall et al. [22] provide
the most substantial contribution to statistical privacy with FDA to date, working within the DP
framework and the Gaussian mechanism for releasing a finite number of point-wise evaluations, with
applications to kernel density estimation and support vector machines. They provide a limiting
argument that establishes DP for certain sets of functions. One of the major findings of Hall et al.
[22] is the connection between DP and Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Spaces, which we extend more
broadly to Cameron-Martin Spaces. Recently, Alda` & Rubinstein [1] extended the work of Hall
et al. [22] by considering a Laplace (instead of a Gaussian) mechanism and focused on releasing
an approximation based on Bernstein polynomials, exploiting their close connection to point-wise
evaluation on a grid or mesh. Other related contributions include Alvim et al. [2] who consider
privacy over abstract metric spaces assuming one has a sanitized dataset, and Smith et al. [38] who
examine how to best tailor the mechanism from Hall et al. [22].
Our Contribution: In this work, we move beyond Hall et al. [22], Alda` & Rubinstein [1] and
Smith et al. [38] by establishing DP for functional data much more broadly. We first show that
the Gaussian mechanism achieves DP for a large class of linear functionals and then show that
this mechanism offers seemingly complete protection against any summary imaginable, covering
any “path level” summaries, nonlinear transformations, or even a full function release, though the
later is usually not computationally feasible without some additional structure (e.g., continuous
time Markov chains). Such extensions are critical for working with transformations that are not
simple point wise evaluations, such as basis expansions, norms, and derivatives or when the objects
exhibit complex nonlinear dynamics. We also provide an interesting negative result, that shows that
not all Gaussian noises are capable of achieving DP for a particular summary, regardless of how
the noise is scaled. In particular, we introduce a concept called compatibility, and show that if a
noise is not compatible with a particular summary, then it is impossible to achieve DP. To establish
the necessary probabilistic bounds for DP we utilize functional densities via the Cameron-Martin
Theorem. This is also of independent interest in FDA as densities for functional data are rarely
utilized due to the lack of a natural base measure [4]. Most attempts at utilizing or defining densities
for functional data involve some work-around to avoid working in infinite dimensions [12, 10]. Lastly,
we demonstrate these tools by considering mean function estimation via penalized smoothing, where
in addition to the DP results we also provide guarantees on the utility of the sanitized estimate.
One of the major findings of this work is the interesting connection between regularization
and privacy. In particular, we show that by slightly over smoothing, one can achieve DP with
substantially less noise, thus better preserving the utility of the release. This is driven by the fact
that a great deal of personal information can reside in the “higher frequencies” of a functional
parameter estimate, while the “lower frequencies” are typically shared across subjects. To more
fully illustrate this point, we demonstrate how a cross-validation for choosing smoothing parameters
can be dramatically improved when the cross-validation incorporates the function to be released.
Previous works concerning DP and regularization have primarily focused on performing shrinkage
regression in a DP manner [e.g. 27, 8] and model selection with linear regression (e.g., Lei et al.
[32]), not exploiting the regularization to recover some utility as we propose here.
Organization: The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present
the necessary background material for DP and FDA. In Section 3 we present our primary results
concerning releasing a finite number of linear functionals followed by full function and nonlinear
releases. In Section 4 we present an application to penalized smoothing for mean estimation, which
is especially amenable to our privacy mechanism. In Section 5 we present simulations to highlight
the role of different parameters, while in Section 6 we present an application of Diffusion Tensor
Imaging of Multiple Sclerosis patients. In Section 7 we discuss our results and present concluding
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remarks.
2. Background.
2.1. Differential Privacy. Differential Privacy, DP, was first introduced in Dwork [13], Dwork
et al. [16]. Let D be a (potentially infinite) population of records, and denote by D the collection of
all n-dimensional subsets of D. Throughout we let D and D′ denote elements of D. Notationally, we
omit the dependence on n for ease of exposition. We work with (, δ)-DP, where  and δ could be
considered as parameters representing the privacy budget with smaller values indicating stronger
privacy; when δ = 0 we obtain pure- or -DP. DP is a property of the privacy mechanism applied
to the data summary, in this case fD := f(D), prior to release. For simplicity, we will denote
the application of this mechanism using a tilde; so f˜D := f˜(D) is the sanitized version of fD.
Probabilistically, we view f˜D as a random variable indexed by D (which is not treated as random).
This criteria can be defined for any probability space.
Definition 2.1 (Dwork [13], Wasserman & Zhou [40]). Let f : D → Ω, where (Ω,F) is some
measurable space. Let f˜D be random variables, indexed by D, taking values in Ω and representing
the privacy mechanism. The privacy mechanism is said to achieve (, δ)−DP if for any two datasets,
D and D′, which differ in only one record, we have
P (f˜D ∈ A) ≤ P (f˜D′ ∈ A)e + δ,
for any measurable set A ∈ F .
The most common setting is when Ω = R, i.e., the summary is real valued. In Section 3.1 we take
Ω = RN , corresponding to releasing N linear functionals of a functional object, while in 3.2 we will
consider the case when Ω = B, a real separable Banach space. In Hall et al. [22], they were able to
consider the space of real valued functions over Rd, i.e., the product space Ω = RT with T = Rd (or
some compact subset), by clever limiting arguments of cylindrical sets; they thus considered DP
over RT equipped with the cylindrical σ-algebra (i.e. the smallest σ-algebra that makes point-wise
evaluations measurable). However, in most cases we are actually interested in a subspace of RT ,
such as the space of continuous functions, square integrable functions, differentiable functions, etc.
It turns out that the resulting σ-algebras (and thus the protection offered by DP) are in general
quite different, and that working directly with RT can result is some fairly glaring holes. Chapter
7 of Billingsley [5] or Section 3.1 of Bogachev [6] discuss these issues, but it is interesting to note
that the cylindrical σ-algebra on RT is missing the sets of linear functions, polynomials, constants,
nondecreasing functions, functions of bounded variation, differentiable functions, analytic functions,
continuous functions, functions continuous at a given point, and Borel measurable functions. To
avoid this issue, we work directly with the Borel σ-algebra on the function space of interest, which
in our case will always be a Banach space, though in principle this approach can be extended to
handle any locally convex vector space.
At a high level, achieving (, δ)−DP means that the object to be released changes relatively little
if the sample on which it is based is perturbed slightly. This change is related to what Dwork [13]
called sensitivity. Another nice feature is that if f˜D achieves DP, then so does any measurable
transformation of it; see Dwork et al. [15, 16] for the original results, Wasserman & Zhou [40] for
its statistical framework, and Dwork & Roth [14] for a more recent detailed review of relevant DP
results.
4 MIRSHANI, REIMHERR, AND SLAVKOVIC
2.2. Functional Data Analysis. Much of FDA is built upon the Hilbert space approach to
modeling, i.e., viewing data and/or parameters as elements of a particular Hilbert space (most
commonly L2[0, 1] after possibly rescaling). However, we take a more general approach by allowing
for arbitrary separable Banach spaces, which will dramatically increase the application of our results,
while requiring only a small amount of more technical work. All of the concepts/tools from this
section are classic probability theory results that might be of interest in the FDA and privacy
communities. We refer the interested reader to Bogachev [6] for a nearly definitive treatment of
Gaussian measures. Throughout we let B denote a real separable Banach space; we always implicitly
assume that B is equipped with its Borel σ-algebra.
Let θ : D → B denote the particular summary of interest and for notational ease, we define
θD := θ(D). In Section 3.1 we consider the case where the aim is to release a finite number of
linear functionals of θD, whereas in Section 3.2 we consider releasing sanitized versions of the entire
function or some nonlinear transformation of it (such as a norm or basis expansion).
The backbone of our privacy mechanism is the same as in Hall et al. [22], and is used extensively
across the DP literature. In particular, we add Gaussian noise to the summary and show how the
noise can be calibrated to achieve DP. A random process X ∈ B is called Gaussian if f(X) is
Gaussian in R, for any continuous linear functional f ∈ B∗ [6, Def. 2.2.1]. Throughout we use ∗ to
denote the corresponding topological dual space. Equipped with the norm ‖f‖B∗ = sup‖h‖B≤1 f(h),
the dual space is also a separable Banach space. The pair (B, ν) is often called an abstract Weiner
space [6, Sec. 3.9], where ν is the probability measure over B induced by X. Every Gaussian process
is uniquely parametrized by a mean, µ ∈ B, and a covariance operator C : B∗ → B, which for every
f ∈ B∗ satisfies
E[f(X)] = f(µ), C(f) = E[f(X − µ)(X − µ)]
[30]. One can equivalently identify C as a bilinear form C(f, g) = Cov(f(X), g(X)), and we will use
both notations whenever convenient. It follows that
f(X) ∼ N (f(µ), C(f, f)),
for any f ∈ B∗. We use the short hand notation N to denote the Gaussian distribution over R, but
include subscripts for any other space, e.g., NB for B.
A key object concerning privacy will be the Cameron-Martin space [6, Sec. 2.4] of X (or equivalently
of (B, ν)). Using C one can equip B∗ with an inner product
〈f, g〉K := Cov(f(X), g(X))
=
∫
f(x− µ)g(x− µ) dν(x),
which implies that B∗ can be identified as a linear subspace of L2(B, ν), that is, ν-square integrable
functions over B. However, B∗ is no longer complete under this inner product; denote the completed
space as K. Finally, consider the set of all h ∈ H ⊂ B such that the mapping
f → f(h)
is continuous in the K topology. Intuitively, these functions are ones that are ”nicer” than arbitrary
elements of B. In particular, they must be regular enough to ensure that f(h) is finite for any f ∈ K,
which are much ”uglier” functionals than those in B∗. By the Riesz representation theorem, we can
associate each element h ∈ H with a Th ∈ K such that 〈Th, f〉K = f(h). The set H equipped with
the inner product
〈x, y〉H = 〈Tx, Ty〉K,
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is called the Cameron-Martin Space, and is itself a separable Hilbert space. Note that, slightly less
abstractly, we have C(Th) = h [6, Lemma 2.4.1]. One can also view K as being a type of Reproducing
Kernel Hilbert Space [6, pg. 44] in a very broad sense since we have 〈Th, f〉K = f(h), for any f ∈ K.
In infinite dimensions the Cameron-Martin space does not contain the sample paths of X, but they
can be thought of as ”living at the boundary” of H. While the Cameron-Martin space is introduced
via Gaussian processes, it is determined entirely by the covariance operator C.
2.3. Hilbert Space Example. While working with a general Banach space allows for a broader
impact, it is also conceptually much more challenging. We can gain additional insight by considering
what happens when B = H is actually a Hilbert space. By the Riesz Representation Theorem, H is
isomorphic to H∗ so we can always identify H∗ with H and de-emphasize the linear functionals.
We can obtain very convenient expressions if we take a basis {vi : i = 1, 2, . . . } of H consisting of
the eigenfunctions of C (recall in Hilbert spaces C must be nonnegative definite and trace class). In
this case we have that
C(vi) = λivi.
So assuming that that there are no zero eigenvalues, define ei = λ
−1/2
i vi, then these form an
orthonormal basis of K as
〈ei, ej〉K = λ−1/2i λ−1/2j Cov(〈vi, X〉H, 〈vj , X〉H) = δij ,
where δij is 1 if i = j and zero otherwise. The space K consists of all linear combinations of the ei
whose coefficients are square summable. The inner product on Cameron-Martin space, H, is given
by
〈x, y〉H =
∑ 〈x, vi〉H〈y, vi〉H
λi
,
so that
H :=
{
x ∈ H :
∞∑
i=1
〈x, vi〉2H
λi
<∞
}
.(1)
In other words, those elements of H are the functions whose coefficients in the vi basis decrease
sufficiently quickly. Note that the case where some λi are actually zero (meaning C has a nontrivial
null space) can be easily handled by restricting H to the range of C.1
The spaceH is a Hilbert space when equipped with the inner product 〈x, y〉H =
∑
λ−1i 〈x, vi〉〈y, vi〉.
When H = L2[0, 1] and K is an integral operator with continuous kernel k(t, s), then H is isomorphic
to a Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space, RKHS [3] (one has to be slightly careful as L2 consists of
equivalence classes).
3. Privacy Enhanced Functional Data. In this section we present our main results. The
mechanism we use for guaranteeing differential privacy is to add a Gaussian noise before releasing
θD. In other words, our releases will be based on a private version θ˜D, where θ˜D = θD+σZ. However,
it turns out that not just any Gaussian noise, Z, can be used. In particular, the options for choosing
Z depend heavily on the summary θD. This is made explicit in the following definition.
Definition 3.1. We say that the summary θD is compatible with a Gaussian noise, Z ∼
NB(0, C), if θD resides in the Cameron-Martin space of Z for any D ∈ D.
1In fact, such a game can be played quite broadly as any Radon measure over a Fre´chet space will concentrate on a
reflexive separable Banach space [6, Thm 3.6.5].
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Intuitively, this means that the noise must be “rougher” than the summaries. Our next definition
is a generalization of one from Hall et al. [22], which focused on functions in RKHS only.
Definition 3.2. The global sensitivity of a summary θD, with respect to a Gaussian noise
Z ∼ NB(0, C) is given by
∆2 = sup
D′∼D
‖θD − θD′‖2H,
where D′ ∼ D means the two sets differ at one record only, and ‖ · ‖H is the norm on the Cameron-
Martin space of Z.
The global sensitivity (GS) is a central quantity in the theory of DP. In particular, the amount of
noise, σZ, depends directly on the global sensitivity. There are other notions of “sensitivity” in the
DP literature, such as local sensitivity, but here our focus is on the global sensitivity that typically
leads to the worst case definition of risk under DP; for a detailed review of DP theory and concepts,
see Dwork & Roth [14]. If a summary is not compatible with a noise, then it is possible to make the
global sensitivity infinite, in which case no finite amount of noise would be able to preserve privacy
in the sense of satisfying DP.
Theorem 3.1. If a summary θD ∈ B is not compatible with a noise Z ∼ NB(0, C) then for any
σ > 0, θ˜D := θD + σZ will not satisfy DP.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the Cameron-Martin Theorem, which characterizes the
equivalence/orthogonality of Gaussian measures. If the summary is not compatible with the noise,
then there exists a D ∼ D′ such that ‖θD − θD′‖H =∞, which implies that the distributions f˜(D)
and f˜(D′) are singular.
Intuitively, if the summary is not compatible with the noise, then one can pool even small amounts
of information from across an infinite number of dimensions to produce a disclosure.
3.1. Releasing Finite Projections. We begin with the comparatively simpler task of releasing a
finite vector of linear functionals of θD. In particular, we aim to release f(θD) = {f1(θ), . . . , fN (θD)},
for fi ∈ K ⊃ B∗ and some fixed N . While placed in a more general context, the core concepts involved
are the same as in Hall et al. [22] (they focused on point-wise evaluations, which are continuous
linear functionals over an appropriate space). Interestingly, since we are using the Cameron-Martin
space, we can actually release more than just continuous linear functionals; we can release any
functional from K, which is, in general, much larger than B∗.
Theorem 3.2. Assume θD is compatible with Z ∼ N (0, C),  ≤ 1, and define
θ˜D = θD + σZ with σ
2 ≥ 2 log(2/δ)
2
∆2.
Now define f(θD) = {f1(θ), . . . , fN (θD)} and f˜(θD) = {f1(θ˜D), . . . , fN (θ˜D)}, for {fi ∈ K}Ni=1. Then
f˜D achieves (, δ)-DP in RN .
Theorem 3.2 can be viewed as an extension of Hall et al. [22] who focus on point-wise releases. If
B is taken to be the space of continuous functions with an appropriate topology, then Theorem 3.2
implies point-wise releases are protected as well. However, this theorem allows the release of any
functional in K. This dramatically increases the release options and applications as compared to
Hall et al. [22] or Alda` & Rubinstein [1].
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3.2. Full Function and Nonlinear Releases. While Section 3.1 covers a number of important
cases, it does not cover all releases of potential interest. In particular, full function releases are not
protected and neither are nonlinear releases, such as norms or derivatives. A full function release
is not usually practically possible, however in some situations, such as continuous time Markov
chains, full paths can be completely summarized using a finite number of values, but these values
are not simple point wise evaluations or linear projections and thus not covered under Hall et al.
[21], Alda` & Rubinstein [1] or our results from Section 3.1. Regardless of this point, there is a certain
comfort in knowing that one has a complete protection that holds regardless of whatever special
structures one might be able to exploit or new computational tools that might become available. In
addition, one can obtain a great deal of insight by considering the infinite dimensional problem, as it
highlights the fundamental role smoothing plays when trying to maintain utility while achieving DP.
To guarantee privacy for these types of releases, we need to establish (, δ)-DP for the entire
function, not just finite projections. This means that in Definition 2.1, the space is taken to be B,
which is infinite dimensional. In previous works [e.g., 17, 22] to establish the probability inequalities
like in Definition 2.1, bounds based on multivariate normal densities were used. This presents a
serious problem for FDA and infinite dimensional spaces as it becomes difficult to work with such
objects (there is very little FDA literature that does so). For example, Delaigle & Hall [12] define
densities only for finite “directions” of functional objects. Another example is Bongiorno & Goia [7]
who define psuedo-densities by carefully controlling “small ball” probabilities. Both works claim
that for a functional object the density “generally does not exist.” However, this turns out to be
a technically incorrect claim, while still often being true in spirit. The correct statement is that,
in general, it is difficult to define a useful density for functional data. In particular, to work with
likelihood methods, a family of probability measures should all have a density with respect to the
same base measure, which, at present, does not appear to be possible in general for functional data.
The difficulty in defining densities in infinite-dimensional spaces comes from the fact there is
no common base or reference measure [9], such as Lebesgue measure, however our goal in using
densities is more straightforward. We require densities (with respect to the same base measure) for
the family of probability measures induced by {θD +σZ : D ∈ D}, where Z is a mean zero Gaussian
process in B with covariance operator C. It turns out that this is in fact possible because we are
adding the exact same type of noise to each element. We give the following lemma, which is simply
an application of the classic Cameron-Martin Theorem.
Lemma 3.1. Assume that the summary θD is compatible with a noise Z. Denote by Q the
probability measure over B induced by σZ, and by {PD : D ∈ D} the family of probability measures
over B induced by θD + σZ. Then every measure PD has a density over B with respect to Q, which
is given by
dPD
dQ
(x) = exp
{
− 1
2σ2
(‖θD‖2H − 2TθD(x))} ,
Q almost everywhere. Recall that θD = C(TθD) and that the density is unique up to a set of Q
measure zero.
At this point we stress that the noise is chosen by the user; it is not a property of the data. The
primary hurdle for the user is ensuring that the summary is compatible with the selected noise. As
we will see in Section 4, one can accomplish this by using specific estimators. Lemma 3.1 implies
that, for any Borel measurable set A ⊂ B we have
PD(A) =
∫
A
dPD
dQ
(x) dQ(x),
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which we exploit in our proofs later on.
Now that we have a well defined density we can establish differential privacy for entire functions.
Theorem 3.3. Let fD := θD, and assume that it is compatible with a noise Z and that  ≤ 1,
then f˜D := fD + σZ achieves (, δ)-DP over B (with the Borel σ-algebra), where σ is defined in
Theorem 3.2.
We also have the following simple corollary.
Corollary 3.1. Let f be compatible with a noise Z, and let T be any measurable transformation
from B→ S, where S is a measurable space. Then T (fD + σZ) achieves (, δ)-DP over S, where σ
is defined in Theorem 3.2.
Together, Theorem 3.3 and Corollary 3.1 imply that the Gaussian mechanism gives very broad
privacy protection for functional data and other infinite dimensional objects, as nearly any trans-
formation or manipulation of the privacy enhanced release is guaranteed to maintain DP; this is
known as a postporocessing property (e.g., see Dwork & Roth [14]).
4. Privacy for Mean Function Estimation. In this section we consider the problem of
estimating a mean function µ from a sample X1, . . . , Xn that are iid elements of H with EXi = µ ∈ H
and ‖Xi‖H ≤ τ <∞ for all i. We derive a bound on the global sensitivity as well as utility guarantees.
In Section 5 and in the Supplemental we will illustrate how to produce private releases of mean
function estimates based on RKHS smoothing in more specific settings. In Hall et al. [22] one can
also find examples for kernel density estimation and support vector machines.
As is usual in the DP literature, we assume that the data is standardized so that it is bounded,
usually with τ = 1. In this case, the sample mean µˆ = n−1
∑n
i=1Xi is root-n consistent and
asymptotically normal [28]. There are a multitude of methods for estimating smooth functions,
however, a penalized approach is especially amenable to our privacy mechanism. In this case we
define a penalty using the covariance of the noise, C. However, the penalty and noise kernels need
not be exactly the same, and in particular, we assume that penalty uses Cη for some η ≥ 1. Here
Cη has the same eigenfunctions as C, but the eigenvalues have been raised the power η. This allows
for greater flexibility in terms of smoothing and it is helpful for deriving utility guarantees. We
define the penalized estimate of the mean µ
µˆ = argmin
m∈H
1
N
N∑
i=1
‖Xi −m‖2H + φ‖m‖2η,
where φ is the penalty parameter. The norm ‖ · ‖η is defined as the Cameron-Martin norm of Cη.
While the most natural candidate is η = 1, taking something slightly larger can actually help with
statistical inference as we will see later on. Here, we can see the advantage of a penalized approach
as it forces the estimate to lie in the space H which means that the compatibility condition, as
discussed in theorems 3.1 and 3.2, is satisfied. A kernel different from the noise could be used,
but one must be careful to make sure that the compatibility condition is met. If (λj , vj) are the
eigenvalue/function pairs of the C and {Xi =
∑∞
j=1 xijvj : i = 1, . . . , N}, with xij = 〈Xi, vj〉H, then
the estimate can be expressed as
µˆ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∞∑
j=1
ληj
ληj + φ
xijvj ,(2)
We then have the following result.
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Theorem 4.1. If the H norm of any element of the population is bounded by a constant
0 < τ <∞ then the GS of µˆ for η ≥ 1 is bounded by
∆2n ≤
4τ2
N2
sup
j
λ2η−1j
(ληj + φ)
2
or more simply
∆2n ≤
τ2
N2φ1/η
[
(2η − 1)2−1/η
η2
]
≤ 4τ
2
N2φ1/η
.
The resulting bound is practically very useful. Data can be rescaled so that their H bound is,
for example, 1, and then the remaining quantities are all tied to the used noise/RKHS. Thus, the
bound can be practically computed and the corresponding releases are guaranteed to achieve DP.
We conclude with a final theorem that provides a guarantee on the utility of µˆ + σZ. One
interesting note is that in finite dimensional problems, the magnitude of the noise added for privacy
is often of a lower order than the statistical error of the estimate. However, in infinite dimensions,
this is no longer true unless η > 1. This is driven by the fact that the squared bias is of the order
φ, and thus φ must go to zero like N−1 if it is to balance the variance of µˆ. However, in that case
the magnitude of the noise added for privacy is of the order σ2  N−2+1/η. If η = 1, then σ2 is
also of the order N−1, while if η > 1, then it is of a lower order and thus asymptotically negligible.
We remind the reader that the noise and thus C is arbitrary, so η can be chosen in a way that is
appropriate for µ by using a rougher noise.
Theorem 4.2. Assume the Xi are iid elements of H with norm bounded by τ <∞. Define
µ˜ := µˆ+ σZ,
where
σ2 =
[
2 log(2/δ)
2
]
×
[
τ2(2η − 1)2−1/η
N2φ1/ηη2
]
.
If the tuning parameter, φ, satisfies φ ∝ N−1 and if ‖µ‖η <∞ then we have
E ‖µ˜− µˆ‖2H = o(N−1) and E ‖µ˜− µ‖2H = O
(
N−1
)
,
while µ˜ achieves (-δ) DP in H.
5. Empirical Study. Here we briefly present simulations with B = L2[0, 1] to explore the
impact of parameters on the utility of sanitized releases. We consider the problem of estimating
the mean function from a random sample of functional observations using RKHS smoothing, as
discussed in Section 4.
For the RKHS, H, we consider the Gaussian (squared exponential) kernel :
C1(t, s) = exp
{−|t− s|2
ρ
}
(3)
We simulate data using the Karhunen-Loeve expansion, a common approach in FDA simulation
studies. In particular we take
Xi(t) = µ(t) +
m∑
j=1
j−p/2Uijvj(t) t ∈ [0, 1],(4)
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where the scores, Uij , are drawn iid uniformly between (−0.4, 0.4). The functions, vj(t), are taken
as the eigenfunctions of C1 and m was taken as the largest value such that λm was numerically
different than zero in R (usually about m = 50). All of the curves are generated on an equally spaced
grid between 0 and 1, with 100 points and the RKHS kernel and the noise kernel will be taken to
be the same (i.e. η = 1). The range parameter for the kernel used to define H is taken ρ = 0.001
and the smoothness parameter of the Xi(t) is set to p = 4 . The mean function, sample size and DP
parameters will also be set as µ(t) = 0.1 sin(pit), N = 25, ( = 1, δ = 0.1), respectively. We vary the
penalty, φ, from 10−6 to 1 to consider its effect.
Note that we take τ = sup ‖Xi‖H for any i ∈ 1, . . . , N and thus all qualities needed for Theorem
4.1 are known. The risk is fixed by choosing the  and δ in the definition of DP. We thus focus on
the utility of the privacy enhanced curves by comparing them graphically to the original estimates.
Ideally, the original estimate will be close to the truth and the privacy enhanced version will be
close to the original estimate. What we will see is that by compromising slightly on the former, one
can makes substantial gains in the latter.
In Figure 1 we plot all of the generated curves in grey, the RKHS smoothed mean in green, and
the sanitized estimate in red. We can see that as the penalty increases, both estimates shrink towards
each other and to zero. There is a clear “sweet spot” in terms of utility, where the smoothing has
helped reduce the amount of noise one has to add to the estimate while not over smoothing. Further
simulations that explore the impact of different parameters can be found in the supplemental B.
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Fig 1: Original and private RKHS smoothing mean with Gaussian Kernel (C1) for different values of penalty
parameter φ
6. Applications. In this section we illustrate our method on an application involving brain
scans (diffusion tensor imaging, DTI) that gives fractional anisotropy (FA) tract profiles for the
corpus callosum (CCA) and the right corticospinal tract (RCST) for patients with multiple sclerosis
as well as controls; data are part of the refund [24] R package. This type of imaging data is becoming
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more common and the privacy concerns can be substantial. Images of the brain or other major
organs might be quite sensitive source of information, especially if the study is related to some
complex disease such as cancer, HIV, etc. Thus it is useful to illustrate how to produce privacy
enhanced versions of function valued statistics such as mean functions. We focus on the CCC data,
which includes 382 patients measured at 93 equally spaced locations along the CCA.
Our aim is to release a sanitized RKHS estimate of the mean function. We consider three kernels
C1, C3 and C4 which correspond to the Gaussian kernel, Mate´rn kernel with ν = 3/2, and the
exponential kernel, respectively. Each kernel is from the Mate´rn family of covariances [39]. The
exact forms are given in (6) in the supplement, where a fourth kernel C2 is also considered that is
“inbetween” C1 and C3 (hence the odd numbering). In all settings we take (, δ) = (1, 0.1) and select
the penalty, φ, and range parameter, ρ, according to two different approaches. The first is regular
Cross Validation, CV, and the second we call Private Cross Validation, PCV. In CV we fix φ and
then take the ρ that gives the minimum 10-fold cross validation score. We do not select φ based on
cross validation because, based on our observations, the minimum score is always obtained at the
minimum φ for this data. In PCV we take nearly the same approach, however, when computing the
CV score we take the expected difference (via Monte-Carlo) between our privacy enhanced estimate
and the left out fold from the original data. In other words, we draw a sample of privacy enhanced
estimates, compute a CV score for each one, and then average the CV scores. In our simulations
we use 1000 draws from the distribution of the sanitized estimate. We then find both the φ and ρ
which give the optimal PCV score based on a grid search.
For the CV-based results, for each of the kernels, we fixed a value for φ ∈ {0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.03}
and then vary the ρ between [0.01, 2]. We use the optimal parameter values in Table 1 to produce
the privacy enhanced estimates for C1 in Figure 2. We see that the utility of the privacy enhanced
versions increases as φ increases, however, the largest values of φ produce estimates that are over
smoothed. There is a good trade-off between privacy and utility with φ = 0.01 for C1. The results
for other kernels are reviwed in supplemental C.
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Fig 2: Mean estimate for cca and its private release using Gaussian kernel (C1) with CV.
12 MIRSHANI, REIMHERR, AND SLAVKOVIC
Turning to PCV, we varied φ in range [10−4, 0.1] for each of the kernels but ρ will be varied in
[0.01, 0.1], [0.05, 0.5] and [0.2, 1] for C1,C3 and C4 respectively. Here we use the optimal parameters
in Table 2 to generate privacy enhanced estimates, given in Figure 3. Here we see that the utility of
the privacy enhanced estimates is excellent for C1. Using PCV tends to over smooth the original
estimates (green lines), however, by slightly over smoothing we make substantial gains in utility as
we add less noise.
Fig 3: Mean estimate of CCA and its private release for Exponential (C4), Mate´rn(3/2) (C3) and Gaussian
kernels (C1) using PCV.
7. Conclusions. In this work we have provided a mechanism for achieving (, δ)-DP for a wide
range of summaries related to functional parameter estimates. This work expands dramatically
upon the work of Hall et al. [22], Alda` & Rubinstein [1], Smith et al. [38], who explored this topic
in the context of point-wise releases of functions. Our work covers theirs as a special case, but
also includes path level summaries, full function releases, and nonlinear releases quite broadly.In
general, functional data can be highly identifiable compared to scalar data. In biomedical settings,
for example, a study may collect and analyze many pieces of information such as genomic sequences,
biomarkers, and biomedical images, which either alone or linked with each other and demographic
information, lead to greater disclosure risk[33].
The heart of our work utilizes densities for functional data in a way that has not yet been explored
in the functional data literature. Previously, usable densities for functional data were thought not
to exist [12] and researchers instead relied on various approximations to densities. We showed how
useful forms for densities can be constructed and utilized. However, it is still unclear how extensively
these densities can be used for other FDA problems.
The literature on privacy for scalar and multivariate data is quite extensive, while there has been
very little work done for FDA and related objects. Therefore, there are many opportunities for
developing additional theory and methods for such complicated data. One issue that we believe
will be especially important is the role of smoothing and regularization in preserving the utility of
privacy enhanced releases. As we have seen, a bit of extra smoothing can go a long way in terms
of maintaining privacy, however, the type of smoothing may need to be properly tailored to the
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application for much complicated objects.
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Supplemental Material
APPENDIX A: PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 3.2. For fi ∈ K define
ν>D = (f1(θD). . . . , fN (θD)),
and the matrix K = {〈fi, fj〉K}; recall C(fi, fj) = 〈fi, fj〉K. Using Proposition 3 of Hall et al. [22],
we then need only to show that
(νD − νD′)>K+(νD − νD′) ≤ ‖θD − θD′‖2H,
where + denotes the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse. We take a common strategy to such
problems by showing that the left hand side can be expressed as ‖P (θD − θD′)‖2H, where P is a
projection operator. Recall that we can move between K and H via the transformation h = CTh for
h ∈ H and Th ∈ K. Define the operator, P1 : B→ span{f1, . . . , fN} ⊂ K as
P1(x) =
N∑
i=1
fi
N∑
j=1
(K+)ijfj(x)
and its analog into H, P : B→ span{C(f1), . . . , C(fN )}:
P (x) = C(P1(x)) =
N∑
i=1
C(fi)
N∑
j=1
(K+)ijfj(x).
Notice that while P1 maps elements of B to K ⊃ B∗, P2 maps elements of B into the Cameron-Martin
space, H ⊂ B. By the reproducing property, there exists TθD−θD′ ∈ K such that
〈TθD−θD′ , P1(θD − θD′)〉K
=
N∑
i=1
〈fi, TθD−θD′ 〉K
N∑
j=1
(K+)ijfj(θD − θD′)
=
N∑
i=1
fi(θD − θD′)
N∑
j=1
(K+)ijfj(θD − θD′)
= (νD − νD′)>K+(νD − νD′).
Moving to H we have
〈TθD−θD′ , P1(θD − θD′)〉K = 〈θD − θD′ , P (θD − θD′)〉H.
If we show that P is a projection operator over H, i.e., symmetric and idempotent, we will have the
desired bound.
First, P is idempotent by direct verification:
P 2(x) =
N∑
i=1
C(fi)
N∑
j=1
(K+)ijfj
(
N∑
k=1
C(fk)
N∑
l=1
(K+)klfl(x)
)
=
N∑
i=1
C(fi)
N∑
j=1
(K+)ij
N∑
k=1
C(fk, fj)
N∑
l=1
(K+)klfl(x)
=
N∑
i=1
C(fi)
N∑
l=1
(K+)ilfl(x) = P (x).
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Second, we show P is symmetric with respect to the H inner product by making repeated use of
the reproducing property:
〈P (x), y〉H = 〈P1(x), Ty〉K
=
N∑
i=1
fi(y)
N∑
j=1
(K−1)ijfj(x)
= 〈Tx, P1(y)〉K = 〈x, P (y)〉H.
Hence P is a projection operator from H to K, and the claim of the theorem holds.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We aim to show that for any measurable subset A ⊂ B we have
PD(A) ≤ ePD′(A) + δ,
where PD denotes the measure of f˜D. Recall the global sensitivity for the functional case is
∆2 = sup
D∼D′
‖fD − fD′‖2H.
The density of f˜D wrt σZ is
exp
{
− 1
2σ2
(‖fD‖2H − 2TD(x))
}
,
where for simplicity we denote TD = TθD . We equivalently aim to show that
PD(A) =
∫
A
dPD(x) =
∫
A
dPD
dPD′
(x)dPD′(x)
≤ e
∫
A
dPD′(x) + δ.
We can express
dPD
dPD′
(x) =
dPD
dQ
(x)/
dPD′
dQ
(x)
= exp
{
− 1
2σ2
(‖fD‖2H − ‖fD′‖2H − 2(TD − TD′)(x))
}
.
Expand
‖fD′‖2H = ‖fD′ − fD + fD‖2H
= ‖fD′ − fD‖2H + ‖fD‖2H − 2〈fD − fD′ , fD〉H,
and recall that we can write 〈x, y〉H = Tx(y). So we have
dPD
dPD′
(x) =
exp
{
− 1
2σ2
(−‖fD − fD′‖2H − 2(TD − TD′)(x− fD))
}
.
Decompose B = H1
⋃H2 where for x ∈ H1 we have dPD
dPD′
(x) ≤ e and for x ∈ H2 we have
dPD
dPD′
(x) > e. Then trivially we have that
PD(A) = PD(A ∩H1) + PD(A ∩H2).
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Using the definition of H1 we have that
PD(A ∩H1) =
∫
A∩H1
dPD
dPD′
(x)
dPD′
dQ
(x) dQ(x)
≤ e
∫
A∩H1
dPD′
dQ
(x) dQ(x) ≤ ePD′(A).
The proof will be complete if we can show that
PD(A ∩H2) ≤ δ.
This is equivalent to showing that
P
(
− 1
2σ2
(−‖fD − fD′‖2H
− 2(TD − TD′)(X − fD)) ≥ 
)
≤ δ,
where X ∼ N(0, σ2C). This can equivalently be stated as
− 1
2σ2
(−‖fD − fD′‖2H − 2(TD − TD′)(X − fD)) ≥ 
⇔ (TD − TD′)(X) ≥ σ2
[
− 1
2σ2
‖fD′ − fD‖2H
]
However (TD − TD′)(X) is a normal random variable with mean zero and variance ‖fD − fD′‖2H. So,
if Z ∼ N(0, 1) then we have that
P
(
− 1
2σ2
(−‖fD − fD′‖2H − 2(TD − TD′)(X − fD)) ≥ 
)
≤ P
(
σ∆Z ≥ σ2
[
− 1
2σ2
‖fD − fD′‖2H
])
≤ P
(
Z ≥ σ
∆
[
− ∆
2
2σ2
])
= P
(
Z ≥
√
2 log(2/δ)− 
2
√
2 log(2/δ)
)
≤ P
(
Z ≥
√
2 log(2/δ)− 1
2
√
2 log(2/δ)
)
≤ δ
as long as  ≤ 1 [22].
A.1. Derivation of RKHS Estimate. Recall that
g(m) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
‖Xn −m‖2H + φ‖m‖2η.
Without loss of generality, we may drop any terms not involving m and write
g(m) = −2〈X¯,m〉H + ‖m‖2H + φ‖m‖2η
= −2〈X¯,m〉H + 〈m,m〉H + φ〈m,C−ηm〉H.
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Since we are working with a Hilbert space, it can be identified with its own dual. We transfer
everything over to the Cameron-Martin Space of Cη, call it Hη, which contains H:
g(m) = −2〈X¯, Cηm〉H
+ 〈m,Cηm〉H + φ〈m,m〉H.
We then have that
g′(m) = −2CηX¯ + 2Cηm+ 2φm.
Setting the above equal to zero we have that
CηX¯ = Cηµˆ+ φµˆ.(5)
or
µˆ = (Cη + φI)−1Cη(X¯).
Since (λj , vj) are the eigenvalues/eigenfunctions of C and Xi =
∑∞
j=1 xijvj then we have
µˆ =
∞∑
j=1
〈µˆ, vj〉Hvj =
∞∑
j=1
ληj
ληj + φ
〈X¯, vj〉Hvj
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
∞∑
j=1
ληj
ληj + φ
xijvj .
Proof of Theorem 4.1. The upper bound for ∆2n is derived as following:
∆2n = sup
D∼D′
‖µˆD − µˆD′‖2H
= sup
D∼D′
‖ 1
N
∞∑
j=1
ληj
(ληj + φ)
(x1j − x1′j)vj‖2H
≤ 1
N2
sup
j
λ2η−1j
(ληj + φ)
2
sup
D∼D′
∞∑
j=1
〈X1 −X ′1, vj〉2H
=
1
N2
sup
j
λ2η−1j
(ληj + φ)
2
sup
D∼D′
‖X1 −X ′1‖2H
≤ 4τ
2
N2
sup
j
λ2η−1j
(ληj + φ)
2
.
We can also derive a simpler bound by examining the function
f(x) =
x2η−1
(xη + φ)2
, x ≥ 0,
and where it attains its maximum. Taking the derivative we have f ′(x) = 0 if and only if
(xη + φ)2(2η − 1)x2η−2 − x2η−12ηxη−1(xη + φ) = 0
(xη + φ)(2η − 1)− 2ηxη = 0
x = (φ(2η − 1))1/η.
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Taking a second derivative shows that this is where the maximum occurs. We then have that
f(x) ≤ (φ(2η − 1))
2−1/η
(φ(2η − 1) + φ)2 = φ
−1/η (2η − 1)2−1/η
4η2
Thus, we can also use the bound
4τ2
N2
sup
j
λ2η−1j
(ληj + φ)
2
≤ τ
2
N2φ1/η
(2η − 1)2−1/η
η2
.
For η = 1, the bound becomes τ2N−2φ−1, while another calculus argument shows that regardless of
η, one will always have
τ2
N2φ1/η
(2η − 1)2−1/η
η2
≤ 4τ
2
N2φ1/η
,
as desired.
APPENDIX B: EXTENSION OF EMPIRICAL STUDY
In this section we review the impact of different parameters on the utility of sanitized releases
introduced in Section 5. For the RKHS, H, we would consider four popular kernels:
C1(t, s) = exp
{−|t− s|2
ρ
}
(6)
C2(t, s) =
(
1 +
√
5|t− s|
ρ
+
5(t− s)2
3ρ2
)
exp
{
−√5|t− s|
ρ
}
C3(t, s) =
(
1 +
√
3|t− s|
ρ
)
exp
{
−√3|t− s|
ρ
}
C4(t, s) = exp
{−|t− s|
ρ
}
.
the first is also known as the Gaussian or squared exponential kernel and the last is also known as
the exponential, Laplacian, or Ornstein-Uhlenbeck kernel.
Recall the all parameters discussed in Section 5 will be fixed in all scenarios, except for the one
where they are explicitly varied to consider their effect.
The scenario 1 was discussed in Section 5.
Scenario 2: Varying kernel range parameter ρ. Here all defaults are used except the range
parameter for the noise and RKHS (which are taken to be the same in all settings) that ranges
from 0.002 to 2. The results are presented in Figure 4. We see very similar patterns to Scenario 1,
where increasing ρ increases the smoothing of both the estimate and its privacy enhanced version.
However, increasing ρ smooths more than it shrinks and there is still a non-negligible difference
between the two estimates for larger values, (e.g., ρ = 0.2). Practically, both ρ and φ should be
chosen together for the best performance, which we will explore further in Section 6.
Scenario 3: Varying the kernel function c(t, s). Here we consider the four different kernels given
in (6) for both the noise and RKHS kernel (which are taken to be the same). The results are
summarized in Figure 5. All kernels give roughly the same pattern, however, C1 produces curves
which are infinitely differentiable, while the exponential kernel produces curves that are nowhere
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Fig 4: Original and private RKHS smoothing mean with Gaussian Kernel (C1) for different values of kernel
range parameter ρ
differentiable (they follow an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process). The two Mate´rn covariances give paths
that have either one (C3) or two (C2) derivatives. Since the underlying function to be estimated is
already very smooth, the kernel does not have a substantial impact. However, for more irregular
shapes, this choice can play a substantial role on the efficiency of the resulting RKHS estimate.
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Fig 5: Original and private RKHS smoothing mean for different kernels
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Scenario 4: Varying the smoothing parameter of samples p. In this setting we vary p from 1.1 to
4, which determines the smoothness of the data, Xn(t). Note that p has to be strictly larger than
1 or the Xi will not be square integrable. Figure 6 summarizes these results. As we can see, the
smoothness of the curves has a smaller impact on the utility of the sanitized estimates as compared
to other parameters. As the curves become smoother, the global sensitivity decreases implying the
need for less noise being added in order to maintain the desired privacy level, and thus resulting in
a higher utility for the privacy enhanced curves. However, the smoothness, in terms of derivatives,
of the estimates is not affected, as this is determined by the kernel.
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Fig 6: Original and private RKHS smoothing mean with Gaussian Kernel (C1) for different values of
smoothing parameter of samples p
Scenario 5: Varying the privacy parameters (, δ). In this setting we vary the privacy parameters,
 and δ. Figure 7 present the effects of varying  from 5 to 0.1 while in Figure 8 we vary δ from
0.1 to 10−6. As we decrease the parameters, we are requiring a stricter form of privacy, which is
reflected in the plots; recall that δ = 0 will give us the stricter form of DP, -DP (also called -DP).
As we decrease these values, the overall noise added increases, and we expect larger deviations of
the sanitized estimates from the mean. There is less sensitivity in the output to changes in δ than to
. However, as with the previous scenario these parameters play no role in the overall smoothness,
in terms of derivatives of the resulting estimates.
Scenario 6: Varying sample size N. In Figure 9 we vary the sample size from 5 to 100. The
results are very similar to changing δ and , as the sample size does not influence the smoothness of
the curves (in terms of derivatives), but the accuracy of the estimate (green curve) gets much better
and so does the utility of the privacy enhanced version.
Scenario 7: Different underlying mean function µ . Lastly, in Figure 10 we consider three
additional mean functions. Overall, the actual function being estimated does not influence the utility
of the privacy enhanced version, only the accuracy of the original estimate. This is because the
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Fig 7: Original and private RKHS smoothing mean with Gaussian Kernel (C1) for different values of privacy
level parameter  when δ = 1
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Fig 8: Original and private RKHS smoothing mean with Gaussian Kernel (C1) for different values of privacy
level parameter δ when  = 1
noise to be added is computed from the different smoothing parameters as well as the range of the
L2 norm of the data, not the underlying estimate itself.
APPENDIX C: EXTENSION OF DIFFUSION TENSOR IMAGING
In this section our aim is to see the privacy enhanced RKHS smoothing estimate of the mean
function discussed in Section 6 for C3 and C4 based on the optimal parameters in Table 1 for CV.
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Fig 9: Original and private RKHS smoothing mean with Gaussian Kernel (C1) for different sample sizes N
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Fig 10: Original and private RKHS smoothing mean with Gaussian Kernel (C1) for different initial mean
functions µ
The results are given in Figures 11 and 12 for Matern and Exponential kernels, respectively. In each
case, we see that the utility of the privacy enhanced versions increases as φ increases, however, the
largest values of φ produce estimates that are over smoothed. Here Table 2 represents the optimal
parameters to generate privacy enhanced estimates for PCV.
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Exp. Kernel Mat 3/2 Kernel Gau. Kernel
φ optimum ρ optimum ρ optimum ρ
1 0.0001 0.25 0.10 0.01
2 0.001 0.20 0.15 0.01
3 0.01 0.30 0.15 0.03
4 0.03 0.80 0.30 0.05
Table 1
Optimum kernel range parameters ρ for different kernels with using CV for each fixed penalty parameter φ in DTI
dataset
Kernel range φ range ρ optimum φ optimum ρ
C1 [10
−4, 0.1] [0.01, 0.1] 0.005 0.030
C3 [10
−4, 0.1] [0.05, 0.5] 0.005 0.250
C4 [10
−4, 0.1] [0.2, 1] 0.010 0.466
Table 2
Optimum penalty and range parameters (φ, ρ) for different kernels with PCV in CCA application.
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Fig 11: Mean estimate for CCA and its private release using Mate´rn(3/2) kernel (C3) with CV.
PRIVACY FOR FDA 11
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
φ=10−4
cc
a
original functions
mean function
private mean
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
φ=0.001
cc
a
original functions
mean function
private mean
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
φ=0.01
cc
a
original functions
mean function
private mean
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
φ=0.03
cc
a
original functions
mean function
private mean
Fig 12: Mean estimate for cca and its private release using Exponential kernel (C4) with CV.
